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Abstract: The Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment in its August 2009 
Consultation Paper, Code of Practice for Grocery Goods Undertakings, argues that a 
Code governing grocery supplier/retailer relations, enforced by an Ombudsman, should 
be introduced.  The Code constrains the behaviour of the retailer with respect to certain 
practices that, for example, shift risk from the retailer to the supplier as well as those 
result in unexpected costs to suppliers.  The rationale for the Code appears to be that 
due to the devaluation of sterling, combined with the recession, retailers are able to put 
increased pressure on local suppliers for lower prices, which in turn squeezes suppliers’ 
margins. The paper argues that the Consultation Paper does not present a sound 
rationale for the Code, in reality the Code is a form of protectionism occasioned by the 
inflow of lower priced imports. Local suppliers should adapt through developing better 
products and becoming more efficient, rather than seeking shelter from market forces. 
The impact of the Code will likely be to lead to: higher consumer prices lowering 
consumer welfare and thus inconsistent with the declared aim of the Code; increased 
costs of doing business with local suppliers thus leading to an incentive for retailers to 
use more imports; and, perhaps, a less competitive grocery sector.  It is argued that the 
Consultation Paper should be withdrawn and reissued, but in a manner consistent with 
the government’s better regulation agenda which is currently ignored.  To the extent that 
the issue of concern is excessive buyer power of retailers then that should be addressed 
directly: by liberalising the Retail Planning Guidelines as the Competition Authority has 
been arguing for sometime; and/or sponsoring entry of new retailers; and/or amending 
competition law, if a problem exists and can be demonstrated to exist, but retain the 
competition test.  The answer, based on the evidence presented in the Consultation 
Paper, is not the Code. 
 
 
Corresponding Author: Paul.Gorecki@esri.ie 
 
 
Key words: better regulation; buyer power; countervailing buyer power; sterling devaluation; grocery 
products; imports; grocery code of practice; grocery ombudsman. 
 
                                                 
∗ The author is a research professor at the Economic and Social Research Institute.  I should like to thank John 
Evans, John Fitz Gerald, Ted Henneberry and Sean Lyons for their helpful comments and suggestions.  An earlier 
version of the paper was submitted to the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment as part of the 
consultation process concerning the Code.  The usual disclaimer applies. 
ESRI working papers represent un-refereed work-in-progress by members who are solely responsible 
for the content and any views expressed therein. Any comments on these papers will be welcome and 
should be sent to the author(s) by email. Papers may be downloaded for personal use only. 
 2 
A Code of Practice for Grocery Goods Undertakings and An 







On 11 August 2009 the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (“the 
Minister”) launched a public consultation with the publication of a Consultation 
Paper, Code of Practice for Grocery Goods Undertakings (DETE, 2009a).  The 
consultation exercise is concerned with the details of the Code of Practice for Grocery 
Undertakings (“the Code”), not whether there should or should not be a code.1  The 
consultation exercise is thus seeking views on, for example, whether the Code should 
be voluntary or statutory and how enforcement of, and compliance with, the Code 
should be funded.  In other words, the decision to establish the Code and an 
enforcement mechanism – an Ombudsman2 – has already been taken; the consultation 
exercise is thus designed to “seek the views of all stakeholders in relation to the 
details of the provisions of such a Code” (DETE, 2009b, p. 3).   
 
This is, however, an unduly narrow focus for consultation.  Prior to any discussion of 
the details of the Code, attention needs to be paid to the rationale and justification for 
the Code.  This is an essential prerequisite for sound public policy.  It is recognised in 
the government’s better regulation agenda, the first principle of which is necessity, “is 
the regulation necessary?” (Department of the Taoiseach, 2004, p. 2).   Increased 
regulation through, for example, the imposition of the Code without considering 
whether or not it has a sound rationale, has the potential to impose unnecessary costs 
on the economy.  These costs may be multiplied if the Code is used as a model for 
                                                 
1 There was neither prior consultation on the question of whether or not the Code is warranted nor any 
report setting out the case for the Code.  However, it should be noted that the Consultation Paper does 
not entirely ignore the issue of whether or not the Code is needed, since there is a reference to 
welcoming “comments and observations in relation to any aspect or issue in relation to the introduction 
of a Code, including whether or not a Code is needed” (DETE, 2009b, p. 4).  However, this is not one 
of the eight consultation questions posed in the Consultation Paper, which are set out in Box 1 below.  
2 It should be noted that although the Code envisages an Ombudsman, the Consultation Paper proposes 
other alternatives for the enforcement of the Code such as the merged Competition Authority/National 
Consumer Agency (DETE, 2009b, pp. 6-7).  For the purposes of this paper we will assume that a 
separate Ombudsman is preferred, unless otherwise stated. 
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other parts of the economy without careful consideration. The vintners, for example, 
are already calling for an ombudsman to ensure that financial institutions are 
operating “fairly and transparently in offering credit facilities to SMEs” (VFI, 2009).   
 
A sound rationale is also needed in order to identify the correct solution, on the 
assumption that there is a problem in the first place. The rationale for increased 
regulation should answer the question: what is the market failure that merits 
government intervention?3  Once a failure is identified then an appropriate solution 
can be designed to address the market failure.  Consultation can then take place as to 
whether or not it is the best solution.  The costs and benefits of the solution can be 
considered, together with whether or not the solution is proportionate, given the 
problem.  A sledgehammer should not be used to crack a nut.  
 
This paper is primarily concerned with whether or not the Code is justified or not and 
whether the Code is an appropriate response to the perceived market failure.  Less 
attention is paid to the fine detail of whether or not the Code should be voluntary or 
put on a statutory footing.  While these latter issues are important, they are of second 
order importance.   
 
Section 2 of the paper sets out the Minister’s proposals together with the consultation 
questions.  Section 3 conducts a critical examination of the stated rationale for the 
Code, while Section 4 asks, given the stated rationale, is the Code the most 
appropriate instrument?  Next attention turns in Section 5 to whether or not the 
objectives of the Code conflict or are consistent.  The Code is redolent with phrases 
that might be found in competition law, so Section 6 examines the relationship 
between the Code and competition law.  Section 7 studies various aspects of the 
economics of the Code, while the potential impact of the Code is examined in Section 
8.  The conclusion to the paper is presented in Section 9.   
 
                                                 
3 This is the appropriate frame of reference in view of the government’s regulatory impact analysis 
(‘RIA’) approach to examining the likely effects of proposed new regulations (Department of the 
Taoiseach, 2005).  The RIA is part of the government’s better regulation agenda.  There is no reference 
to either the government’s better regulation agenda or the regulatory impact analysis in the 
Consultation Paper 
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The preamble to the ‘Draft Code of Practice for Grocery Goods Undertakings’ states 
that the Code is designed “to provide for fair trade between grocery undertakings” 
(DETE, 2009b, p. 14).  It is also stated that the key objective of the Code is to 
“achieve a balance in the relationships between grocery goods undertakings, taking 
into account the need to enhance consumer welfare and the need to ensure that there is 




The Code requires that its provisions be incorporated into contracts (i.e. Business 
Agreements) between grocery goods undertakings for the production, supply or 
distribution of grocery goods. 4  The Code states that certain business matters can only 
be addressed in – as opposed to outside –  a contract between grocery undertakings, 
including:5 
 
• No variation in contractual terms and conditions unless specifically agreed 
in the contract; 
• A retailer is prohibited from requiring a supplier to make any payment6 
towards a shrinkage  unless agreed in the contract; 
• A retailer is prohibited from requiring a supplier to make any payment 
towards covering wastage  unless agreed in the contract;  
• Unless there is unambiguous agreement in the contract that full compensation 
is not appropriate, retailers are required to compensate suppliers for 
erroneous forecasts unless the retailer can demonstrate that the forecasts 
have been prepared in good faith and in consultation with the supplier.  
                                                 
4 Grocery goods are defined as “any food or drink for human consumption that is intended to be sold as 
groceries” (DETE, 2009b, p. 14), while a grocery goods undertaking is defined as “an undertaking that 
is engaged for gain in the production, supply or distribution of grocery goods, whether or not the 
undertaking is engaged in the direct sale of those goods to the public” (DETE, 2009b, p. 14).  
5 The bullet points follow closely DETE (2009b, pp.15-16). 
6 Payments are defined as “any compensation or inducement in any form (monetary or otherwise) and 
includes more favourable contractual terms” (DETE, 2009b, p. 15). 
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Retailers are required to communicate to suppliers the basis on which 
forecasts of supply have been prepared; and, 
• A retailer is prohibited from requiring a supplier to make any payment 
towards a retailers’ marketing costs unless agreed in the contract. 
 
In these instances the Code constraints the behaviour of the retailer rather than the 
supplier. 
 
The Code further limits the behaviour of the retailer with respect to the payments the 
retailer can seek or require from the supplier:  
 
Unless provided for in the Terms of Business Agreements, a Retailer may not 
seek payment from a supplier to secure a better positioning or an increase in 
shelf space unless such payment is in relation to a promotion7 (DETE, 2009b, p. 
16); and, 
 
A retailer is prohibited from requiring payments as a condition of listing a 
supplier’s products unless such payments are made in relation to a promotion or 
the payments reflect the reasonable risk run by the retailer in listing new 
products (DETE, 2009b, p. 16). 
 
Thus a retailer may not seek or require a payment from a supplier for a  better product 
positioning in a retail store or an increase in shelf space or the listing of a supplier’s 
products, unless it is in relation to a promotion or risk sharing with respect to new 
product(s). 
 
In terms of advertising or display of grocery goods: 
 
A retailer shall not directly or indirectly require a supplier to make any payment 
or grant any allowance for the advertising or display of grocery goods (DETE, 
2009b, p. 17). 
 
Finally, the Code, as with erroneous forecasts, is proscriptive with respect to the 
allocation of risk when a retailer orders grocery goods for a promotion from the 
supplier:  
                                                 
7 Promotion is defined as “any offer for sale at an introductory or a reduced retail price or with some 
other benefit to consumers that is intended to subsist for a specified period of time” (DETE, 2009b, p. 
15). 
 6 
Where retailers and suppliers have agreed to participate in a promotion in 
relation to certain grocery goods, the retailer is obliged [to] take reasonable care 
when ordering those grocery goods at a promotional wholesale price not to over 
order and to ensure that the basis on which any order is made in relation to 
promotional products is transparent. Where a retailer fails to take such steps, the 
retailer must compensate the supplier for any product over ordered and which it 
subsequently sells at a higher nonpromotional retail price (DETE, 2009b, p. 17). 
  
Thus while the preamble to the Code talks in general terms of ‘balance’ and ‘fair 
trade’ between grocery undertakings, without any reference as to where an imbalance 
or unfairness may exist, it is clear from the actual provisions of the Code that the 
current imbalance is considered to be in favour of the retailer, not the supplier.  
 
The Grocery Ombudsman 
 
The Code is to be enforced by the Grocery Ombudsman (“the Ombudsman”) who is 
responsible for “[I]nvestigations, complaints and disputes between grocery 
undertakings in relation to the provision of this Code …” (DETE, 2009b, p. 17).  The 
Ombudsman will be appointed by and report to the Minister.  The Ombudsman has, as 
alluded to above, a number of different roles: to investigate complaints; to arbitrate 
between grocery undertakings; to publish guidance; to make recommendations as to 
how compliance with the Code can be improved; and, to advise the Minister on the 
operation of the Code.  This is a wide remit. 
 
The Consultation Questions 
 
There are many issues surrounding the Code that need to be resolved prior to 
implementation.  The consultation exercise divides these issues into eight questions 
which are presented in Box 1 below.  They cover a wide variety of issues such as the 
type of grocery undertaking which should be subject to the Code, to the method of 
enforcement, whether a fair balance has been established between retailers and 
suppliers, and whether the Code will impact on consumer prices.  As noted above the 
purpose of this paper is not so much to address these questions but rather whether or 
not the Code and the Ombudsman are justified.  Nevertheless, we will deal with 
consultation questions 6 to 8 concerned with the balance between grocery 




Box 1: The Eight Consultation Questions on the Code and the Ombudsman 
Q.1 Should the introduction of any Code be on a voluntary or statutory basis? Who 
should draw-up such a Code? How do you see compliance costs varying between a 
voluntary and a statutory Code? 
Q.2 Depending on whether any Code is voluntary or statutory, how should it be 
enforced? How should such enforcement be funded? 
Q.3 Should a separate Ombudsman’s office be established, and, if so, how and by 
whom will this be funded, both on establishment and on an ongoing basis? 
Q.4 What type of grocery chain elements should be covered by the Code? Should a 
threshold be introduced to limit the application of the Code? If so, on what criteria 
should it be based and at what level should it be set? 
Q.5 Should any Code be limited in geographical extent and, if so, what should that 
limitation be and how would the provisions of the Code be enforced against grocery 
goods undertakings located outside the jurisdiction? 
Q.6 Will the provisions of the attached initial draft outline Code help to achieve a fair 
balance in the relationships between retailers and suppliers? Are there any specific 
provisions, which inhibit achieving that balance? Are there other provisions, which 
might help to achieve that balance? 
Q.7 What will be the impact of any Code on the consumer and prices of goods for 
consumers and how should any Code be framed to enhance consumer welfare and the 
need to ensure that there is no impediment to the passing-on of lower prices to 
consumers? 
Q.8 Have you any specific comments to make on the contents of the draft outline 
Code of Practice for Grocery Goods Undertakings, appended to this document? 
Source: DETE (2009b, pp. 3-4). 
 
 
3. The Rationale for the Code and the Ombudsman: Does it Stack-Up? 
 
The rationale for the Code and the Ombudsman contained in the Consultation Paper is 
terse.  It is presented in Box 2 below, together with the background and objective of 
the Code, both of which are discussed further below.   
 
The rationale for the Code is that retailers can import grocery products either from the 
UK or elsewhere at lower prices than comparable products are available from 
suppliers and distributors in Ireland.8  As a result the margins of suppliers and 
distributors are squeezed because retailers have resort to lower priced imports.  This 
gives rise to an alleged imbalance in the relationship between, on the one hand, 
retailers and, on the other hand, suppliers and distributors.  In other words, retailers 
                                                 
8 It is, of course, recognised that the rationale presented here is based on the reported contentions of 
suppliers and retailers as set out in the Consultation Paper.  However, the rationale advanced is 
consistent with the events leading up to the proposals for the Code and Ombudsman which are 
discussed further below.  The Consultation Paper does not itself articulate a rationale for the Code. 
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can threaten to import lower priced comparable grocery products from outside of 
Ireland in order to secure lower prices from locally sourced products.  As we saw in 
Section 2 above, the Code attempts to redress this alleged imbalance by constraining 
the behaviour of the retailer. 
 
Box 2: The Code and the Ombudsman: Background, Rationale and Objective 
Interest in proposals to introduce a Code of Practice for the grocery sector has its 
genesis in the context of the wider debate in relation to prices and in particular the 
differential in prices between this jurisdiction and Northern Ireland and the UK. 
 
Since the publication of the Forfás report on the “Cost of Running Retail Operations 
in Ireland” in December 2008, the focus of the debate in relation to grocery prices and 
the differential in prices between here and Northern Ireland and the UK has shifted to 
issues in relation to the cost of sourcing products and distribution/supply 
arrangements attaching to the supply of products. 
 
Retailers have strongly contended that the cost of sourcing grocery goods products is 
much dearer in Ireland than the cost of sourcing such products in the UK and 
elsewhere. On the other hand suppliers and distributors have contended that there is a 
significant imbalance in the relationship between retailers and suppliers, which is 
giving rise to suppliers being squeezed by the increasingly difficult demands being 
made by retailers. 
 
The Government, for its part, is concerned to ensure that Ireland continues to have 
vibrant and successful food and retail sectors, given the important role these sectors 
play in the national economy. 
 
With this in mind, the Tánaiste and Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment 
has announced her intention to introduce a Code of Practice which will have as its key 
objective the need to achieve a balance in the relationships between grocery goods 
undertakings, taking into account the need for a fair return to both suppliers and 
retailers, the need to enhance consumer welfare and the need to ensure that there is no 
impediment to the passing-on of lower prices to consumers. 
 
While contractual agreements between suppliers and retailers are essentially matters 
for themselves, subject to compliance with the provisions of the Competition Act 
2002 and the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 as these apply to the grocery retail 
sector, the justification underlying the introduction of a Code of Practice in this area is 
to provide a framework in which the different elements of the retail chain can enter 
into negotiations and agree contractual arrangements between themselves which will 
help to ensure that those arrangements are balanced and fair and ultimately ensure that 
interests of all parties, including consumers, are respected. 
Source: DETE (2009b, pp. 2-3). 
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Governments normally intervene in markets where there are market failures relating 
to market power, externalities and information problems.9  These market failure 
rationales do not apply in the case of the Code.  Here the rationale put forward reflects 
the view that that imports are cheaper than comparable domestically produced grocery 
products, with no suggestion that imports are inappropriately advantaged in some 
such way such as subsidies, exchange rate manipulation and so on.  Under these 
conditions the supplier should be encouraged to adapt and compete with imports, not 
be protected through the Code.10  The conduit or manifestation of these lower priced 
imports is the retailer; it is not the cause.  Thus there appears to be no market failure 
justifying the Code and the Ombudsman; indeed, the market appears to be working as 
it should as lower priced imports replace move expensive uncompetitive Irish 
products.   This puts pressure on local suppliers to improve their performance in terms 
of price, efficiency and innovation; protectionism is unlikely to create such incentives. 
 
An examination of the events leading up to the Minister’s proposals for the Code and 
the Ombudsman provide valuable context with respect to the rationale.  After the 
rapid decline in the value of sterling against the euro at the end of 2008 due to the UK 
recession, Irish shoppers increasingly turned to Northern Ireland for their groceries.11  
There was a concern amongst consumers, the media and elected representatives that 
the strong euro was not translating into lower prices in the Ireland.12  For example, the 
Minister in a speech on 27 January 2009 stated, “Unfortunately, a significant number 
of retailers, including retailers in the grocery sector, have yet to reflect the benefits of 
the Euro’s sustained appreciation in value by way of lower prices to consumers and 
have failed to give any credible reasons for these price differentials” (DETE, 2009c). 
 
The Competition Authority was asked by the Minister in February 2009 to examine 
the issue.  The Competition Authority reported relatively weak competition amongst 
grocery product retailers and concluded that this “might be limiting price reductions 
                                                 
9 These grounds are consistent with the regulatory impact analysis referred to in footnote 3 above. 
10 To the extent that price differences reflect higher costs across many sectors of the economy, then 
those should be addressed directly.  For further discussion on these points see Forfas (2008) and 
Competition Authority (2009, pp. 13-15). 
11 For further discussion of these developments see Revenue Commissioners/Central Statistics Office 
(2009). 
12 There are, of course, likely to be lags in the transmission of lower prices because of exchange rate 
movements.  For a discussion see Competition Authority (2009, pp. 15-21). 
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to consumers” (Competition Authority, 2009, p. vi).  However, it also reported that 
where “retailers have not achieved sufficiently lower prices with existing suppliers, 
retailers have looked for alternatives” (Competition Authority, 2009, p. viii).  In the 
case of Tesco, for example, the leading grocery retailer in Ireland, “it is by-passing 
Republic of Ireland offices of international brands and third party distributors by 
moving to the UK for direct supply for many grocery items” (Competition Authority, 
2009, p. viii).  Indeed, the Competition Authority (2009, p. 45) observed that these 
pressures have “led some retailers and suppliers to completely alter their business 
strategy” in Ireland.  The Competition Authority recommended that the government 
remove certain size restrictions in the Retail Planning Guidelines on supermarkets as a 
way of increasing retail competition (Competition Authority, 2009, p. ix).13 
 
Retailers in Ireland eventually reacted to the strong euro by reducing prices, 
evidenced by Tesco’s announcement on 5 May 2009 (Tesco, 2009).    Grocery prices 
both for brand and own-brand grocery products fell considerably in the first half of 
2009, according to surveys conducted by the National Consumer Agency (2009).  
There were also signs of increased competition for branded grocery products, while 
one leading retailer lowered its own brand grocery product prices so that the gap with 
the ‘hard’ discounters, Aldi and Lidl, was significantly narrowed, according to the 
National Consumer Agency. These price reductions and increased retailer 
competition, in turn, put pressure on food processor margins and farm gate prices. 
 
While these developments provide the background to the introduction to the Code, 
they do not provide a justification in terms of market failure.14 They do, however, 
provide an explanation as to why the Code has been proposed by the Minister.   Both 
grocery suppliers (FDII, 2009)15 and farmers (IFA, 2009a) requested the Minister to 
introduce a Code, which also had the support of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food, who argued that retailers had a responsibility beyond consumers and 
                                                 
13 This has been a longstanding recommendation of the Competition Authority.  See, for example, 
Competition Authority (2003), but also Competition Authority (2009, p. 38). To date the 
recommendation has not been implemented by government.   
14 They do, however, provide a justification in terms of public choice theory.  For further discussion see 
Gorecki (2009b).  Public choice is about explaining the actions of public representatives based on the 
assumption that politicians make choices that they think will get them re-elected.  
15 The FDII also called for other measures such as greater links between third level institutions and 
industry, an increase in credit availability, workable export guarantees and so on.  
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shareholders – to suppliers (DAFF, 2009; DETE, 2009a).16  However, while there are 
many demands for government regulation and intervention, only in instances where 
there is a market failure is government intervention merited. 
 
In sum, on the basis of the arguments made in the Consultation Paper there is not a 
valid justification for the Code and the Ombudsman.  On the available evidence the 
answer to the question asked in the government’s better regulation guidance, is the 
regulation necessary, is no. 
 
4. Rationale and Instrument: Do they Match? 
 
As noted above the rationale for government regulatory intervention identifies the 
market failure for which a solution can then be designed.  Abstracting from the 
discussion in Section 3, in this section the rationale put forward for the Code is 
accepted and the question posed whether the Code is the most appropriate instrument 
of intervention.  In other words, are there other more direct ways of addressing the 
“problem” of imports from the UK and elsewhere than the Code?  We consider two 
possible instruments, trade barriers and financial support. Both are rejected as either 
infeasible or they are already in place, before attention turns to whether or not the 
Code is consistent with the rationale. 
 
The most obvious solution to lower priced imports of grocery products adversely 
effecting local suppliers is to raise the price of imported grocery products vis a vis 
locally supplied grocery products.  This could be achieved by either raising tariffs or 
erecting non-tariff barriers.  Tariffs might be set at a level to offset the devaluation of 
sterling, while non-tariff barriers such as quotas could be set at the level of imports in 
mid-2008, with some allowance for change in overall demand in the economy.  
Alternatively exporters in the UK and elsewhere could be requested to impose 
voluntary export restraints.  However, raising tariffs and placing quantitative 
constraints on another EU Member State is not an option for Ireland, given the 
                                                 
16 In addition unions expressed concerns over possible job losses (SIPTU, 2009). 
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imperative of the single European market and the fact that setting a common external 
tariff is an EU responsibility.17 
 
Another alternative is that grocery products suppliers could be given financial and 
other assistance in order that they can compete more effectively with imported 
grocery products.   Such assistance might include modernisation grants, marketing 
assistance, skill upgrading and so.  However, like raising trade barriers, there are 
reasons why financial and other assistance might not be either feasible or desirable or 
legal.18   
 
First, suppliers are already in receipt of substantial funding to improve their 
competitiveness.  Under the National Development Plan, 2007 to 2013, the Food 
Industry Sub-Programme “will invest €289 million in capital infrastructure and 
marketing” (Ireland, n.d., p. 177).  Immediately prior to the current National 
Development Plan, in 2006, the government announced a €50 million investment 
grant package to beef and sheep meat processors (DAF, 2006).  Grocery suppliers can 
also avail of the €250 million Employment Subsidy Scheme (Temporary) covering 
2009 and 2010 which is designed to “provide an employment subsidy to vulnerable 
but viable manufacturing and/or internationally traded services enterprises that are 
currently engaged in exporting to maintain their full-time workforce.”19 
 
 Second, even if it could be argued that additional financial assistance was 
appropriate, given the recession and the pressure on public expenditure; it is unlikely 
that extra funds would be made available.  Third, many grocery suppliers are large 
firms with a proven track record and strong brands,20 so it is not at all clear why these 
firms cannot borrow funds on the capital market to fund investment to improve their 
competitiveness.21   
                                                 
17 Even if Ireland had the remit to impose tariffs on UK imports, consideration would need to be given 
to any retaliation that might follow such a move. 
18 Legal because financial assistance might contravene EU state aid rules.  
19 For details see http://www.employmentsubsidy.ie/schemeinformation.aspx.  Accessed on 23 
September 2009. 
20 This is consistent with an examination of the top 10 suppliers of grocery suppliers in Ireland, which 
include many well known names such as Kerry Foods, Unilever Ireland, Cadbury Ireland, Coco Cola, 
and Procter & Gamble.  For details see Competition Authority (2009, Table 5, p. 39). 
21 Of course, it could be argued at the present time there are difficulties accessing credit.  However, 
presumably that applies to all firms not just suppliers in the grocery sector. 
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The last instrument selected to address the problem of lower priced imports is the 
Code.  It is not at all clear how the Code addresses the problem of lower priced 
imports; if anything the Code may exacerbate the problem.  To the extent that the 
Code curtails the opportunity for retailers to bargain down prices and other terms and 
conditions with local  suppliers and means that retailers have to turn to less efficient 
methods of obtaining lower priced grocery goods from local suppliers, then this 
increases rather than decreases the attractiveness of imported grocery products.  In 
essence, the Code places a ‘tax’ or ‘levy’ on the use of local suppliers.  Both the Code 
and a tax/levy raise the cost of using local suppliers relative to imports. This provides 
an incentive for retailers to increase the use of imported grocery products.22 
 
In sum, given the rationale for the Code – to prevent or discourage lower priced 
imports of grocery products – the instrument selected is likely to have the opposite 
effect.  Superior instruments – trade barriers or financial support – are either 
infeasible or are already being employed. 
 
5. Objectives: Are they Consistent/Incentive Compatible? 
 
The key objective of the Code, subject to several important caveats or qualifications, 
is set out as follows:  
 
[the] Code of Practice … will have as its key objective the need to achieve a 
balance in the relationships between grocery goods undertakings, taking into 
account the need for a fair return to both suppliers and retailers, the need to 
enhance consumer welfare and the need to ensure that there is no impediment to 
the passing-on of lower prices to consumers (DETE, 2009b, p.2). 
 
Balance is akin to equilibrium, imbalance to disequilibrium. 
 
One characterisation of recent events is that there was arguably a certain balance or 
equilibrium in the relationship between grocery undertakings – retailers and suppliers 
– in mid-2008.23  The appreciation of sterling in late 2008 against the euro combined 
                                                 
22 To the extent that the Code applies to other relationships involving grocery undertakings besides 
retailer/supplier relationships, the Code might lead to suppliers who currently contract out production 
to local firms switching to firms in the UK and elsewhere.  Equally, the discussion is likely to apply to 
international suppliers which either have a local operation or use a local agent.   
23 It should be noted that the call for a Code and an Ombudsman appears to be a relatively recent.  The 
Food and Drink Advisory Group (2004) in a report to the Enterprise Strategy Group (2004), list a 
number of recommendations and challengers facing the sector.  Although there is mention of increased 
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with the recession created an imbalance or disequilibrium.  The status quo became 
untenable: consumers in large numbers switched to shopping in Northern Ireland, 
while Minister and the media berated retailers for not reflecting the appreciation of 
the euro in lower local prices.  Retailers responded by lowering prices and, given the 
change in UK/Irish relative prices increased imports, put further and extra pressure on 
suppliers to reduce prices.24  Thus we are in the process of reaching a new equilibrium 
or balance between suppliers and retailers.    
 
Viewed in this context the key objective of the Code is to restore, in part at least, the 
status quo ex ante; in short, the old equilibrium.  The Code permits the restoration of 
the status quo by reducing the freedom of manoeuvre and discretion of the retailer 
through the adoption of explicit and transparent contracts and restricting the 
availability of certain discounting mechanisms.  This is meant to increase the 
bargaining power of the supplier vis a vis the retailer and thus increase the return to 
suppliers. Such an interpretation is consistent with the favourable response to the 
Minister’s proposals from the suppliers (IBEC, 2009a) and primary producers (IFA, 
2009b), and a much more non-committal response from retailers (IBEC, 2009b). It is 
also consistent with the views of the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, who 
had been consulted closely on the development of the Code, that supermarkets have a 
responsibility beyond shareholders and consumers to suppliers (DAFF, 2009). 
 
If the above characterisation is accepted as reasonably accurate, then grocery prices 
are very likely to be higher under the Code than without the Code.  However, there 
will be a limit to which prices can rise, since consumers and retailers, as they have 
already demonstrated, will switch to purchasing grocery products from Northern 
Ireland and elsewhere.  Thus it appears that the impact of the Code will damage 
consumer welfare by raising grocery prices and will create rather than remove 
impediments to the passing-on of lower prices to the consumer.  There is nothing in 
the Code to protect the consumer interest; there is not, for example, a consumer 
welfare test that needs to be satisfied before the provisions of the Code is invoked.25 
 
                                                                                                                                            
buying power putting pressure on margins, no recommendations or mention is made concerning a 
Code. 
24 No evidence has been adduced that quantifies the magnitude of any increase in imports. 
25 See discussion of Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 below. 
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It could, of course, be argued that grocery prices need not rise and that retailers will 
accept lower returns, since as pointed out above the Competition Authority argued 
that competition amongst retailers is weak and hence they may be earning excess 
returns. However, this line of argument suffers from a number of difficulties.  First, 
subsequent to the Competition Authority report there are signs that competition has 
increased at the retail level, so any rents may have been competed away.  The fall in 
the price of groceries in Northern Ireland due to the devaluation of sterling meant that 
retailers in Northern Ireland became more attractive to southern consumers.  The price 
difference outweighed the travel costs.  At the same time the recession caused 
consumers to become more price conscious, so that existing retailers are competing 
for a more limited consumer demand.  Second, if the retail sector is uncompetitive 
then it is much more preferable to increase competition in that sector.  The 
Competition Authority has recommended that restrictions be removed on the size of 
grocery stores, while John FitzGerald of the Economic and Social Research Council 
has suggested that the government put together a set of sites and invite a large retailer 
into Ireland.26   
 
In sum, the objectives of the Code are inherently contradictory.  The Code’s stated 
purpose is to achieve balance between grocery undertakings, while at the same time 
increasing consumer welfare and ensuring that there is no impediment to lower prices 
being passed-on to the consumer.  However, in achieving balance the Code proposes 
to constrain the behaviour of retailers in favour of suppliers so that the Code is likely 
to lead to a rise in prices for suppliers with no mechanisms or tests for considerations 
of consumer harm to be taken into account.   
6. The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2006: Is the Code Necessary? 
 
The objective of the Code is to create balance between suppliers and retailers.  The 
question of balance can be interpreted as the degree to which one party can take 
advantage of another.  Suppliers and retailers operate across various grocery markets.  
In that context the ability of retailers to take advantage of suppliers, to treat them 
unfairly, implies that retailers have market power over suppliers.  They can dictate the 
                                                 
26 Great care would be needed to ensure that such an intervention did not conflict with either EU state 
aid rules and/or competition law. 
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price as well as other terms and conditions. Indeed, sufficient market power would 
permit the retailer to depress supplier’s price below the competitive level, albeit only 
temporarily.  
 
The Competition Act 2002 contains general provisions that cover the whole of the 
economy that are designed to prevent retailers either collectively or individually 
exerting excessive market power (i.e. buyer power) 27 with respect to suppliers that 
damages competition.  Competition law, as the Supreme Court has recently pointed 
out, has as its object the promotion of consumer welfare.28  If retailers were to form 
an agreement to prevent, restrict, or distort competition, through, for example, 
agreeing to pay no more than €x per 750 gram  package of a grocery product to a 
supplier, then that would be an infringement of competition law.  Equally, if a 
dominant firm were to exert its market power paying a price below the cost29 of the 
supplier then that might be an abuse of a dominant position and thus a breach of 
competition law.30  When considering abuses of a dominant position, the pro-
competitive effects of buyer power must also be considered.  Finally, mergers that 
lead to a substantial lessening of competition are prohibited.  Thus within the 
Competition Act 2002 are mechanisms to protect against anti-competitive imbalance 
in the relationship between retailer and supplier. 
 
Apart from these general provisions of the competition law, the Competition 
(Amendment) Act 2006 contains provisions which relate specifically to grocery 
goods.  The Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 prohibits certain conduct or 
practices, which had previously been prohibited under the Groceries Order,31 which 
are summarised in Box 3 below.  Some of the conduct is remarkably similar to the 
                                                 
27 There is one reference to retailer buyer power (DETE, 2009b, p. 14). 
28 For details see the Supreme Court judgment in the appeal by the Irish league of Credit Unions 
against an earlier High Court judgment in favour of the Competition Authority.  For details of the case 
see Gorecki (2008a): the judgment may be accessed at:   
http://www.courts.ie/Judgments.nsf/288acee47cb5c08780256eb70031e0ea/c693841275fd3e1f802572d
50035d296?OpenDocument.  Accessed on 21 September 2009. 
29 There is some debate about the relevant definition of cost.  For a discussion see Whish (2009, pp. 
706-708).  
30 Of course, the dominant firm might have an objective justification for saying it will accept no more 
than €x such as that the imported price is €x and so the fact that this cost is below the currently 
excessive cost of the local supplier can be justified. 
31 The Groceries Order had criminalised cutting prices below invoice cost.  The Competition 
(Amendment) Act, 2006 abolished the Groceries Order.  For further discussion of the Groceries Order 
see DETE (2005). 
 17 
Code.  However, in contrast to the Code there is a competition test in the legislation – 
the conduct must “have as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition in trade in any grocery goods in the State or in any part of the State.”  
Such a competition test protects the interests of the consumer.  Hence the Code can be 
viewed as akin to the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006, but without a competition 
test. 
 
This raises the issue of whether or not competition law does not already adequately 
address the issue of imbalance between suppliers and retailers, both in general and in 
the grocery sector in particular.   Some of the provisions of the Code could, if a 
compelling case is made, be included as part of the Competition (Amendment) Act 
2006, which has the advantage of having a competition test to protect consumer 
welfare.  However, the Consultation Paper does not raise this possibility at all, with 
discussion of the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 being largely relegated to an 
Annex.32    
 
Box 3: Competition (Amendment) Act 2006: Prohibited Conduct 
The Competition (Amendment) Act, 2006 prohibits certain practices:  
* the imposition of resale price maintenance in regard to the supply of grocery 
goods (resale price maintenance is the practice whereby manufacturers or suppliers 
specify the minimum prices at which their goods may be resold); 
* unfair discrimination in regard to the supply of grocery goods (this is a reference 
to a supplier offering preferential terms to one buyer over another even though the 
transactions involved are equivalent in nature); 
* retailers or wholesalers of grocery goods from compelling or coercing suppliers 
into payment of advertising allowances (e.g. where a retailer seeks payment from a 
supplier in order to advertise the supplier’s goods as a means of attracting customers 
to the retailer’s premises); and 
* Retailers from compelling or coercing suppliers into payment of “hello” money 
(i.e. where a retailer demands a payment from a supplier before agreeing to stock that 
supplier’s products). The circumstances in which the practice is prohibited include on 
the opening of a new store, an extension to an existing store or a change of ownership 
of a store. 
In all four instances the conduct or behaviour had to have the object or effect of the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.   
Source: DETE (2009b, p. 19). 
 
                                                 
32 It is true, however, that reference is made to the fact that if the Code is put on a statutory basis then 
the Code’s obligations “could be set out in a similar manner to the Competition (Amendment) Act 
2006 set out particular obligations for grocery undertakings” (DETE, 2009b, p. 5).  However, there is 
no suggestion that a competition test be applied to the Code’s provisions in the Consultation Paper. 
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In the Annex, however, are a couple of observations concerning the enforcement of 
the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006, which may hold the key as to why the 
Minister does not favour amending this legislation.  First, suppliers “have argued that 
they are loath to make complaints to the Authority, as they fear that this would result 
in their products being delisted by retailers” (DETE, 2009b, p. 20).  The evidence 
suggests that business is the most important source of investigations under the 
Competition Act 2002 (Gorecki, 2008b, Table 1, p. 406).  Hence if it is the case that 
grocery suppliers are reluctant to make complaints under the Competition 
(Amendment) Act 2006, then a potentially valuable source of information of breaches 
of competition law is lost.  This suggests that it is important to determine if this is the 
case33 and whether grocery suppliers are in some sense different from suppliers in 
other sectors of the economy. Second, retailers, not surprisingly, disagree that they 
unfairly exercise buying power and point to the lack of prosecutions under the 
Competition (Amendment) Act 2006.34  However, these reasons apply, mutatis 
mutandis, to the Code and hence do not provide a reason why amending the 
Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 was not put forward as an option in the 
Consultation Paper instead of the Code.   
 
In sum, it is not clear why the Consultation Paper did not put forward the option of 
amending the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 to include some if not all of the 
provisions of the Code, but subject to the competition test, which would protect the 




                                                 
33 Such an exercise might involve asking suppliers, on a confidential basis, for complaints that they 
would like to make to the Competition Authority but are reluctant to do so because they might be 
delisted by the retailer; if such complaints appear to be prima facie breaches of competition law; and, 
what mechanisms can be put in place to encourage complainants to come forward (e.g., through a trade 
association).  It is clear that the fear of delisting is likely to occur in those cases where the retailer has 
market power and hence are likely to be of interest from a competition point of view.  
34The Consultation Paper does not attempt to distinguish between these two points positions as to why 
there have been no cases under the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006.  However, it is of vital 
importance that some attempt be made to determine which explanation is correct and under what 
conditions.  If the former then unless it is resolved the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 is unlikely 




7. The Code: Some Economic and Related Issues 
 
The Code’s Provisions: A Simplification 
 
The Code’s provisions, at the risk of some oversimplification, can be divided into 
three groups: 
 
• Certain payments in relation to shrinkage, wastage and retailers 
marketing costs from the supplier to the retailer can only be made if 
agreed in a written contract; 
• The assignment of risk between retailers and suppliers in relation to 
errors in demand forecasts in general and promotions in particular, is 
placed with the retailer unless the retailer can demonstrate that it acted 
in good faith, shared the basis for its forecasts with the supplier and 
consulted with the supplier; and, 
• The supplier cannot be compelled or required by a retailer to pay for 
better positioning/increase shelf space (except with respect to a 
promotion) or make a payment or grant an allowance for advertising or 
display of grocery goods. 
 
Several observations can be made with respect to these provisions. 
 
No evidence or Justification to Support Code’s Provisions 
There is no justification or reasoning put forward in the Consultation Paper or any of 
the associated documentation that argues why these particular provisions are merited.  
This is a major shortcoming.  How can comments sensibly be made on proposals in 
these circumstances?  Are, for example, the forms of conduct identified above 
extensively employed by retailers in an abusive way with respect to suppliers that also 
adversely affects the welfare of consumers?  If these forms of conduct are prohibited 
or restricted, are there other forms of conduct which will have to same or similar 
effects?  The Consultation Paper should explain not only why restrictions are required 
but also detail how prevalent are the practices listed in the Code.  If these practices are 
not occurring to any material extent at present, then enacting the Code is wasting 
valuable administrative resources.    
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In sum, the Minister needs to carefully spell out why the provisions of the Code are 
necessary. 
 
Why Follow the UK Experience & Model? 
The Code is based on the UK’s Groceries (Supply Chain Practices) Market 
Investigation Order 2009 (“UK Code”) which also sees the establishment of an 
Ombudsman (UK Competition Commission, 2009a, 2009b).  However, the UK Code 
has been, according to the Consultation Paper, “amended to suit Irish conditions” 
(DETE, 2009b, p. 12). The UK Code reflected the results of extensive market 
investigation by the Competition Commission into the supply of groceries which 
determined that certain practices adversely affected competition (UK Competition 
Commission, 2008).   “One of these features was the excessive buyer power by 
certain grocery retailers with respect to their suppliers of groceries, through the 
adoption of supply chain practices that transfer excessive risk and unexpected costs to 
these suppliers” (UK Competition Commission, 2009b, p.1).  The Competition 
Commission argued that these practices “could lead to reduced capacity, reduced 
product quality and fewer new product offerings, and ultimately, to a detriment to 
consumers” (UK. Competition Commission, 2008, p. 157).  
 
A number of points can be made with respect to Ireland adopting the UK model for its 
Code and Ombudsman.35 First, in Ireland the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 
already addresses the competitive problems that afflict retailer/supplier relationships 
in the grocery market, so arguably lessening, if not eliminating the need for a Code 
and an Ombudsman.  Second, the UK proposals reflected a thorough market 
investigation which carefully sifted the evidence.  As noted above no such study has 
been commissioned by the Minister so there can be no assumption that the same 
problems will be as important and prevalent in Ireland.  The Competition Authority 
would be in a position to conduct such a study given its involvement in the 
enforcement of the Competition (Amendment) Act 2006 and the various reports it has 
conducted on the grocery sector.36  Third, there are many differences between the UK 
                                                 
35 There may, of course, some differences, such as whether the Code in Ireland will be voluntary or 
statutory or how the Ombudsman will be funded. 
36 Of course, it could be argued that precisely because the Competition Authority enforces the 
Competition (Amendment) Act 2006, may mean that gathering evidence certain practices may prove 
difficult. 
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and Ireland that would need to be taken into account before concluding that the UK 
experience is relevant to Ireland. For example, Ireland is a much smaller open 
economy than the UK and hence may have fewer degrees of freedom in policy terms 
since retailers can readily source products abroad.  It would therefore have been of 
considerable assistance if the Consultation Paper has specified how and why the UK 
Code had been adapted to suit Irish conditions. 
  
In sum, the Minister needs to specify why the UK model of a Code and Ombudsman 
is the relevant one for Ireland.  
 
 Why Not Follow the US Experience & Model? 
There is no Code or Ombudsman in the US.  Here in respect of grocery retailer 
/supplier interaction, attention has focussed on slotting allowances37 – “one-time 
payments a supplier makes to a retailer as a condition for the initial placement of the 
supplier’s product on retailer’s store shelves or for initial access to the retailer’s 
warehouse space” (FTC, 2003, p. i).  It can be argued that there are both efficiency-
enhancing reasons and anticompetitive arguments in favour and against such practices 
which are summarised in Box 4 below.  It is an empirical question which set of 
reasons best explains the presence of slotting allowances.   
 
Box 4: Slotting Allowances: Efficiency-Enhancing or Anti-Competitive? 
The major efficiency arguments cited in favor of slotting allowances are: (1) that they 
serve to efficiently allocate scarce retailer shelf space to the most valuable (profitable) 
new products; (2) that they serve to allocate risk of new product failure in a balanced 
manner between manufacturers and retailers; (3) that they serve to signal private 
information that manufacturers may have about the potential success of the new 
product to the retailer; and (4) that manufacturers use them to induce retailers to 
accept the product and increase distribution by mitigating the effects of retail 
competition.  The main anti-competitive explanations for slotting allowances are: (1) 
they are a means for retailers to mitigate retail competition to increase their own 
profits by facilitating retail collusion and (2) they are the result of retailers exercising 
retail power, adversely affecting smaller manufacturers and reducing consumer access 
to these products. The retail power argument suggests that in many local markets, 
high retail concentration results in few retailers controlling retail shelf-space, enabling 
them to demand slotting allowances. 
Source: Sudhir & Rao (2005, p.1, emphasis supplied). 
                                                 
37 Some of these considerations would also be relevant with respect to some of the provisions of the 
Code mentioned above.  
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The Federal Trade Commission conducted a study of slotting allowances in the retail 
grocery industry in five product categories.  The findings are more suggestive of the 
efficiency enhancing explanations (US FTC, 2003).  Subsequently Sudhir & Roa 
(2009) found little support, across a large number of new product introductions, for 
the anti-competitive rationale and instead found support for the efficiency rationales 
for slotting allowances.  
 
While it is obviously accepted that the US, like the UK, is different from Ireland in 
many important respects, these findings demonstrate the importance of not only 
conducting research that is specific to Ireland, but also carefully explaining why the 
results and experience of other jurisdictions are especially relevant to Ireland. 
 
Are Retailers in Ireland Really Masters of the Universe? 
The Code assumes, as noted above, that it is the retailer’s market power that needs to 
be constrained, rather than the suppliers.  However, no evidence is offered in 
support.38  In this respect a distinction can usefully be drawn between the retailers 
own brand or private label products (e.g. Dunne’s 250 mg rashers) and brand label 
(e.g., Denny’s 250 mg rashers).  In the former instance it appears that the markets are 
competitive with retailers frequently holding auctions or quasi auctions in order to 
allocate contracts.  In the case of branded products, however, the market power of the 
retailer vis a vis the supplier is likely to be far less; indeed, the supplier may have 
market power.  In a number of merger cases the Competition Authority has concluded 
that the merger between branded grocery products will lead to a substantial lessening 
of competition, despite the presence of retailers, with the result that the merger has 
been prohibited – in the rashers and non-poultry cooked meats markets39 - or the 
merging parties have offered to divest themselves of certain brands – gravies.40  In 
other markets, the evidence indicated that suppliers had strong brand presence and 
                                                 
38 Apart that is from repeating certain contentions made by retailers and suppliers.  See footnote 8 
above. 
39 The Competition Authority prohibited Kerry from acquiring Breeo because it found that there would 
be a substantial lessening of competition in these two markets.  This determination was successfully 
appealed by Kerry to the High Court, and is currently under appeal by the Competition Authority to the 
Supreme Court.  However, for reasons set out in Gorecki (2009a) it is felt that the High Court erred. 
40 For details see Merger Notification M/06/098 – Premier Foods/RHM.  This may be accessed at: 
http://www.tca.ie/MergersAcquisitions/MergerNotifications.aspx?selected_item=319.  Accessed 22 
September 2009. 
 23 
consistently high market shares, such as the stout market where Guinness consistently 
has a market share of at least 85%.41  This is not to deny that retailer may exert 
market power over suppliers in markets, but the Consultation Paper can all too easily 
be interpreted as meaning that the retailer is all powerful.  That is not the case; 
suppliers with strong brands will be able to take care of themselves. 
 
Recessions & Bespoke Protection 
It could be argued that the Code and the Ombudsman is an example of bespoke 
protection.42  Many markets in Ireland suffered from the increase in import 
competition from the UK because of the devaluation of sterling, but only grocery 
undertakings have been protected by specific regulation.  A number of recent papers 
have examined the impact of granting bespoke protection to markets in economies 
suffering a recession.  They suggest that bespoke protection slows the speed of 
recovery and damages long term economic performance.43 In the US under 
Roosevelt’s New Deal policies certain sectors were made exempt from antitrust laws 
and cartels were allowed to be formed provided that wages were raised.  Cole & 
Ohanian (2004) in a careful study of the effects of these policies conclude that “New 
Deal cartelization policies are an important factor in accounting for the failure of the 
economy to recover back to trend” (p. 779).  Equally, in Japan certain sectors were 
shielded from competition using a variety of instruments including “weak antitrust 
enforcement, legalized cartels, subsidies, protection and cooperative R&D” (Porter et 
al, 2000, p. 117).  The evidence suggests that these sectors did not fare well in, for 
example, export markets.  As a result Porter & Sakakibara (2004, p. 47) conclude that 
unless the “serious impediments and distortions” that developed in the 1990s are 
addressed then “the period of Japanese economic stagnation will be unnecessarily 
protracted.” 
 
In sum, great care needs to be given in awarding bespoke protection to grocery 
suppliers through sector specific set of regulations designed to protect one group from 
competition.  Protectionist policies are likely to damage competitiveness; the 
                                                 
41 For details see Merger Notification M/08/011 – Heineken/Scottish & Newcastle.  This may be 
accessed at: http://www.tca.ie/MergersAcquisitions/MergerNotifications.aspx?selected_item=398.  
Accessed 22 September 2009.  
42 This is protection provided to a specific sector or market, in contrast to universal protection 
programmes such as social assistance for those who are unemployed. 
43 The rest of this paragraph follows Gorecki (2009b). 
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corollary is that current circumstances are more likely to drive efficiency enhancing 
reorganisation of the grocery sector so that it can compete internationally. 
 
8. The Impact of the Code 
 
Introduction 
It is difficult to be precise about the impact of the Code and the Ombudsman on prices 
and competition in grocery products.   The details of the Code have to be decided in 
view of the various consultation questions which are set out in Box 1 above.  Once 
those decisions have been made, there will be issues surrounding the propensity of 
suppliers to complain and the Ombudsman to initiate its own inquiries, by, for 
example, carefully examining the contract between grocery undertakings.  In view of 
these uncertainties any conclusions must, of necessity, be somewhat tentative. 
 
Administrative & Compliance Costs 
Costs can be divided into several categories.  There are the costs of the Ombudsman’s 
office and the compliance costs of grocery undertakings.  In both cases there will be 
initial set-up costs and on-going day to day administrative and compliance costs.  An 
example of set-up cost would be ensuring that all supplier-retailer contracts conform 
to the Code; an ongoing cost would be investigations by the Ombudsman of 
complaints from suppliers.  Consideration also needs to be given to opportunity costs 
of the resources used to administer the Code, since these could be employed, for 
example, to enforce competition law. 
 
There are no reliable estimates of the costs of the Ombudsman and compliance costs 
of grocery suppliers and retailers.  In the UK it is has been estimated that the 
Ombudsman’s office would cost £5 million.44  In terms of compliance costs this very 
much depends in the propensity of suppliers to bring complaints to the Ombudsman 
and the degree to which the Ombudsman undertakes investigations/inquiries on their 
own initiative.  In any event, in view of the possibility of a complaint being made by a 
supplier, there may be much greater propensity for communications between retailers 
and suppliers to be in written format, possibly reviewed by lawyers in order to ensure 
                                                 
44 This estimate is taken from Clarke (2009) based on an unpublished work by Cathryn Ross of the 
Competition Commission.  
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no inappropriate language is used.  This will raise the transaction costs of doing 
business.  Suppliers may be reluctant for reasons discussed above to make complaints, 
but there is likely to be no such inhibitions on the Ombudsman undertaking 
investigations into, for example, the degree to which supplier/retailer contracts 
conform to the Code. 
 
In sum, it is difficult to come to conclusion on the magnitude of the administrative 
cost of the Ombudsman or the costs of compliance of business.  In any event whatever 
the cost it will be borne in part at least by consumers,45  since the Ombudsman is to be 
funded by a levy on grocery undertakings,46 while the compliance costs are also borne 
by grocery undertakings.  
 
Restraining Buyer Power: Impact on Competition & Prices 
The impact of the Code on grocery prices depends to a considerable extent on the way 
in which competition can be characterised.  The assumption underlying the Code and 
the Ombudsman is that the retailers exercise buyer power in an excessive or abusive 
manner, although no evidence is provided to support this viewpoint nor why existing 
competition law cannot deal with the problem.  This implies that retailers are getting 
low prices, perhaps even below the supplier’s costs, albeit temporarily.   Accepting 
that premise, if it is concluded, particularly in light of recent events in grocery pricing 
in Ireland, that competition in the downstream retail market is vigorous, then it is 
reasonable to assume that some or all of these low prices are passed-on to the 
consumer. 
 
Under this scenario then the impact of the Code depends on how successful the Code 
is in identifying the marketing and other practices through which retailers are able to 
exert their market power over suppliers.  If the Code is successful in doing so then the 
bargaining power between supplier and retailer will change, with the result that 
retailers will over time pay higher prices to supplier which will be passed on to the 
                                                 
45 Of course, if instead of a separate Ombudsman’s office, the Code were to be administered by the 
merged Competition Authority/National Consumer Agency then an alternative funding mechanism 
might be used, taxes. 
46 It seems clear from the Consultation Paper that this will be the funding mechanism rather than 
funding from the public purse. 
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consumer in whole or in part by the retailer.  However, this argument needs to be 
somewhat nuanced. 
 
The Code does not do away with the market power of the retailers.  What it does is 
prohibit or restrict or control the way in which retailers exert that market power.  
Hence given the ingenuity of business persons, we can expect retailers to design 
alternative methods to exercise their market power.  In the US, for example, the 
Robinson-Patman Act, passed in 1936, prohibited suppliers from “offering differing 
prices to different purchasers of ‘commodities of like grade and quality’ where the 
difference injures competition” (US Antitrust Modernization Commission, 2007, p. 
311).  The legislation was designed to protect small retailers so-called “mom and pop” 
grocery stores from larger more efficient retailers.  However, “[O]ver time, many 
businesses have found ways to comply with the Act by, for example, differentiating 
products, so they can sell somewhat different products to different purchasers at 
different prices.  Such methods are likely to increase the seller’s costs – and thus 
increase costs to consumers – but do nothing to protect small business”  (Ibid,   p. 
311).     
 
There is no reason to assume that retailers in Ireland will not be able to similarly find 
alternative channels to exercise any market power that they may have.  One obvious 
option is to import more from the UK and elsewhere where the remit of the Code and 
the Ombudsman is likely to be much less effective.  However, as noted above, this is 
likely to be a more expensive method of extracting the rent and hence this will 
increase the costs of retailers.  Furthermore, of course, there will then be pressure by 
suppliers to prohibit these new forms of rent extraction which will in turn encourage 
even more costly methods of exercising any excessive market power. 
 
The provisions of the Code might also be expected to mean that retailers become less 
aggressive in dealing with suppliers for fear of the Code being invoked and the 
possibility of adverse publicity hurting their brand.  In other words, the Code and the 
Ombudsman would have a chilling effect on competition, which would lead to an 
upward pressure on prices.  It would also lead to the retailers putting less pressure on 
suppliers to improve efficiency and innovation with the result that the food sector 
would lose this valuable stimulus to improve its competitiveness. 
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In sum, the impact of the Code and the Ombudsman will be to increase consumer 
prices of grocery products.  If there is a concern over the market power of retailers 
then that should be addressed directly by regulatory reform of the Retail Planning 
Guidelines and/or the government sponsoring entry and/or amending competition 




The food and drink sector is important to the Irish economy.  It accounts for over 8% 
of Irish GDP and 18% of gross value added in manufacturing, employing 46,000 
persons and accounts for 66% of exports by indigenous manufacturers (FDII, 2009b, 
p. 4).  Ill-thought out government intervention can have unintended adverse 
consequences for the competitiveness of the sector.  It is for this and other reasons 
that the government’s better regulation agenda sets a framework within which 
regulation should be introduced.  The framework, amongst other things, requires that 
the question of necessity be addressed.  In other words, is the regulation necessary?  
The framework also requires that “regulations be more rigourously supported in terms 
of information, analysis and assumptions that underpin them” (Department of the 
Taoiseach, 2004, p. 11).  This reflects the concern that impact of a regulation may not 
always be clear and in the case of “regulations which affect particular markets, the 
implications can be far-reaching” (ibid., p. 11).47 
 
What is striking about the Minister’s proposals is the way in which the issue of 
necessity is completely side-stepped.  The decision has already been taken to 
implement a Code and establish an Ombudsman; the consultation process is over the 
details, such as whether the Code should be voluntary or statutory.   However, there 
                                                 
47 It could, of course, be argued that the better regulation agenda applies to new regulations that are 
brought about by the legislative process and hence it is not clear that the Code and the Ombudsman is 
covered.  However, it should be noted that one of the consultation questions concerns whether or not 
the Code should be voluntary or statutory (see Box 1 above for details).  Second, as the Taoiseach 
points out the better regulation agenda is an essential part of achieving improved competitiveness 
(Department of the Taoiseach, 2004, p. 1).  Hence just because the Code may be voluntary does not 
mean that the better regulation agenda should not be followed, given the importance of the food and 
drink sector to the economy.  Finally, addressing questions such as necessity and providing supporting 
evidence should be a routine part of any new set of policy proposals subject to consultation.   
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was no prior consultation exercise or policy paper setting out the necessity of 
introducing the Code and the Ombudsman. 
 
Furthermore, there is no rigorous support or explanation for the provisions contained 
in the Code with respect to the adoption of certain supply chain practices that transfer 
risk from the retailer to the supplier and lead to unexpected costs being imposed on 
suppliers by retailers.  While it is true that the proposed Code is largely borrowed 
from the UK, it nevertheless remains the case that the Consultation Paper does not 
explain why the UK experience is more relevant to Ireland than (say) that of the US. 
 
Instead of a Consultation Paper that presents a set of arguments that are rigorously 
supported in terms of information, analysis and assumptions that underpin them, the 
Consultation Paper expresses the views of retailers and suppliers with no attempt to 
evaluate them, even where they give diametrically contradictory view points.  For 
example, why have there been no prosecutions under the Competition (Amendment) 
Act 2006?  The Consultation Paper states the views of the suppliers – making a 
complaint may result in the retailer punishing the supplier by delisting the supplier’s 
product (s) – and retailers – who reject the charge and point to lack of prosecutions as 
proof.  No attempt is made to determine which view is correct by, for example, asking 
for the views of the Competition Authority.  This is important because it has 
implications for the Code where the same arguments can be made. 
 
As a result of these gaps in the Consultation Paper the consultation process becomes 
somewhat limited exercise.  How can comments on a Consultation Paper be made 
when vital issues are not addressed?  If the rationale underlying the Code and its 
provisions are not set out, how can it be argued that the arguments are excellent or 
fallacious?  Furthermore, it sets a dangerous precedent if policy changes in this and 
other areas of government activity can be introduced by essentially ignoring the 
government’s own better regulation approach.48  However, we are we are; what 
should be done next?   
 
                                                 
48 This reflects a wider concern over the adherence to the better regulation agenda based on recent an 
operational review of regulatory impact analysis, an integral part of the agenda.  For details see Goggin 
and Lauder (2008). 
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It is the firm view of this paper that the proposals should be withdrawn by the 
Minister and a new Consultation Paper prepared for discussion.  A fresh Consultation 
Paper should be prepared in conformity with the better regulation agenda.  In this 
paper we have set out questions and concerns with respect to the Code and the 
Ombudsman which we hope will be useful in redrafting the Consultation Paper.  
However, if the Minister decides to press on with this flawed process, what should be 
done? 
 
The thrust of this paper is that the introduction of the Code does not appear to be 
based on a sound rationale: it is in reality protectionism for the grocery supply sector 
because of the squeeze on margins due to a rise in the value of the euro against 
sterling, exacerbated by the recession.  Evidence from the experience of the US in the 
1930s and Japan in the 1990s suggests that shielding sectors from the impact of 
competitive forces makes any subsequent recovery from a recession more difficult 
and that the protected sectors do not fare well in export markets. 
   
Although the object of the Code discusses the need to enhance consumer welfare and 
ensure that there is no impediment to the passing-on of lower prices to consumers, 
there is no provision in the Code that ensures that these conditions are satisfied.  This 
is important because the Code is likely to lead to higher prices for consumers, which 
will lower not raise consumer welfare.   
 
The Code is also likely to lead to less efficient methods of retailer/supplier interaction 
because, without justification, the Code constrains the behaviour of the retailer in 
relation to the supplier.  In addition there are, of course, the compliance costs of 
associated with the Code.  As a result the cost for the retailer of doing business with 
local suppliers will increase rather than decreasing.  This is likely to lead to more not 
less imports of grocery products and possibly a less competitive grocery sector.   
 
The solution is simple.  If the perceived problem is excessive buyer power of retailers 
then liberalise the Retail Planning Guidelines as the Competition Authority has been 
arguing for sometime and/or sponsor entry and/or amend competition law, if a 
problem exists and can be demonstrated to exist, but retain the competition test.  The 
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